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Accession of the European Union (EU) to theCouncil of Europe European Convention on HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) will
bestow many benefits and will also open up the way for
closer cooperation between the two supra-national agen-
cies. To explore this, on 16 May 2011 a one-day conference
entitled “It takes two to tango: the Council of Europe and
the European Union” took place at the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies. Its general theme was the rap-
prochement between the European Union and the Council
of Europe, and in particular the EU accession to ECHR,
the EU accession to the Group of States Against
Corruption (GRECO) and closer cooperation in the area of
money laundering (EU and MONEYVAL, also taking into
account the efforts of the Financial Action Task Forces).
The proceeds of this seminar are due to be published by
JUSTICE in December 2011, in a special issue. The pur-
pose of this introduction is to recall the historical develop-
ment of the relationship between the EU and ECHR.
Three periods can be distinguished in the EU/ECHR
relationship, and these are outlined in part one of this
paper. In the first period, starting in the 1950s, the ECHR
and the EU were two totally distinct systems. In the second
period, from the 1970s onward, Convention rights began
to be recognised as a general principle of EC/EU law and
the case began to be made for accession. Finally, in the
third stage, as a result of EU political union, EU accession
to ECHR was actively sought, culminating in the adoption
of Article 6 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Part two of this paper
focuses on this third stage, looking at some of the legal and
technical issues that have arisen. What makes this
development exciting is the political impetus behind it –
making it possible to resolve complex issues of law and
cooperation within the European space. This could be a
useful blueprint for the future of cooperation between
organisations in other regions of the world.
7
Amicus Curiae Issue 86 Summer 2011
Accession of the European
Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights
by Simone White
(l to r) Wolfgang Rau, Executive Secretary, GRECO, Council of Europe; Lord Tomlinson (chair); Livia Stoica Becht, MONEYVAL, Council of Europe;
Dr Vasil Kirov, Head of Unit Investigations at OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) and previously chairman of MONEYVAL.
The other speakers at the seminar were: Dr Simone White, OLAF and Hon Research Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University
of London (conference organiser); Caroline Ten Dam, Legal Service, European Commission; and Dr Tobias Lock, DADD-Clifford Chance Lecturer
in German law, University College London.
18388 Amicus 86 summer text.qxd:Text  23/8/11  15:25  Page 7
PART 1: FROM BENIGN NEGLECT TO
MAKING THE CASE FOR ACCESSION
Stage 1: ECHR and EU as completely separate legal
spheres
In 1951, 21 countries formed the Council of Europe
and ratified the European Convention on human rights,
promising to protect basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The same year, six of those countries (the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany and
Italy) signed the Treaty of Paris creating the Economic Steel
and Coal Community (ECSC). In 1957 those same six
countries signed two further treaties in Rome, creating the
European Atomic Committee (EURATOM) and the
European Economic Community (EEC).
The three EC treaties contained no express provisions
concerning the protection of human rights in the conduct
of Community affairs. It is true that some articles of the
EEC Treaty touched upon some aspects of human rights.
Article 7 EEC dealt with freedom from discrimination on
the basis of nationality in relation to the free movement of
workers, and Article 119 EEC dealt with freedom from
discrimination in the workplace. However both these
articles dealt with rights in the economic sphere and not
general rights. These economic rights overlap with general
human rights (see Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office
[1974] ECR 1337).
At the early stage, the EC was seen as a legal system
having little to do with human rights; it was sufficient for
the Member States to be party to ECHR. This was to
change gradually, as we shall see.
Stage 2: Convention rights as a general principle of
EC law
Initially, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was
reluctant to acknowledge certain ECHR rights as part of
the EC legal order (Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959]
ECR 17; Cases 36, 37,38 and 40/59 Geitling v High
Authority [1960] ECR 423; Case 40/64 Sgarlatta and others
v Commission [1965] ECR 215). However things began to
change with the Stauder case in 1969 (Case C29/69 Stauder
v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419). In 1970, respect for
fundamental rights as such was recognised by the then
European Court of Justice as forming “an integral part of
the general principles of law protected by the Court of
Justice.” In Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491,
the court added that the protection of such rights, whilst
inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, must be ensured within the framework
and objectives of the Community. This was a clear
recognition that fundamental rights had a role to play in
the EC legal order.
At this stage, therefore, there was only indirect and
potentially limiting reference by the ECJ to ECHR. It soon
became clear that the ECJ could adopt interpretations that
did not coincide exactly with that given by the Strasbourg
court – a major drawback in this “general principle”
doctrine. In Wachauf (1989), the ECJ ruled that the
requirements of the protection of fundamental rights in
the Community legal order are also binding on the
Member States when they implement Community rules.
The ECJ later ruled that if national authorities restrict one
of the fundamental freedoms under the EEC Treaty, the
restriction should comply inter alia with the provisions of
ECHR. We can see that from the 1970s onwards, the ECJ
was in a difficult position. It could not ignore ECHR but it
risked being criticised if it gave a restrictive interpretation
of the Convention, especially in respect of a ruling directed
at a Community institution. On the other hand, were it to
give an extensive ruling in response to a request for a
preliminary ruling, it might force the national courts to
apply a higher standard than that to which they are bound
on the basis of their direct obligations under the ECHR. In
any case, Member States might have to follow an ECJ
judgment which is at variance with ECHR. Another
nagging issue was that anyone dissatisfied with the
interpretation of human rights by the ECJ did not have
access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
a situation that still continues today.
In the 1990s the ECtHR developed the doctrine of
equivalent protection, which presumes that the EU legal
order provides protection which is equivalent to that of the
ECHR and considers claims against the EU inadmissible
(Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland; Appl no 45036/98,
ECHR, 30 June 2005). At the same time, the ECtHR
maintained the principle that Member States remain
responsible for the activities of an international
organisation, whether it has a separate legal personality
making it responsible for violations or not.
The scope of application of the principle of equivalent
protection was clarified in Bosphorus. By “equivalent
protection” the ECHR meant “comparable”, not
“identical” protection. For the purposes of evaluation, the
ECtHR would take into consideration both the substantive
guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their
observance. In Bosphorus, the ECtHR did not find any
manifest deficiencies to the protection of the applicant’s
rights and the application was found inadmissible, which
was viewed by one author as a “missed opportunity to
establish a clear, coherent and uncompromising approach
to the protection of human rights within the Community
legal order” (see Peers, S (2006), “Limited responsibility
of European Union Member States for actions within the
scope of Community law, judgment of 30 June 2005,
Bosphorus Airways v Ireland, Application no 4506/98”,
European Constitutional Law Review, 2: 443-55). In his
concurring opinion on Bosphorus, Judge Ress considered
that the case revealed the importance of European Union’s
accession to the ECHR, in order to make its control
mechanism complete within the Community legal order.
There are arguments against survival of the doctrine of
“equivalent protection” after accession. The doctrine8
Amicus Curiae Issue 86 Summer 2011
18388 Amicus 86 summer text.qxd:Text  23/8/11  15:25  Page 8
creates double standards, since the EU is subjected to less
extensive review of its measures than contracting states; the
doctrine is too abstract and there is no test of
proportionality to legitimise its application. The ground for
this doctrine, it is also argued, disappears after accession,
the judgments of the EU courts becoming subject to
control by the ECtHR. It has also been argued that the
doctrine should be abandoned for its lack of clarity:
Costello and Peers opine that it is not clear under what
circumstances the acts of the EU Member States are
exempted from full judicial review of the ECtHR( see
Peers, S above; Costello, C (2006) “The Bosphorus Ruling
of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental
Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, Human Rights
Review, 6(1): 87-130, p 94).
On the other hand, Saltinyté has argued that pragmatic
considerations impinge and that the ECtHR is unlikely to
abandon the doctrine, in view of the time it would take for
a case to reach the ECtHR after exhausting both EU and
national legal remedies (see Saltinyté, L (2010), “European
Union accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights/ stronger protection of fundamental rights in
Europe?” Jurisprudence, University Mykolas Romeris,
Vilnius, Lithuania, http://www.mruni.eu/Lt/mokslo-
darbai/jurisprudencija). It would be a more equitable and
practical solution, she argues, if the ECtHR decided to
maintain the doctrine – and perhaps even expand it with
respect to the states which, during the term of their
membership, have demonstrated a high standard of human
rights protection. One could imagine that, in some areas,
EU Member States may well prefer to apply the doctrine of
equal protection to a more complex system of scrutiny.
This might be true, for example, in European criminal law
and in police cooperation. With the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon, the area of judicial and police cooperation
in criminal matters has become subject to the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, except for
the jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of
operations carried out by the police or other law-
enforcement services of a Member State, or the exercise of
the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the
safeguarding of internal security.
What of the EC institutions respecting ECHR? Looking
back to the 1970s, the Community itself, through a joint
declaration of the Commission, Council of Ministers and
Parliament (OJ 1977 C103/1) of 5 April 1977, echoed by
the European Council on 7/8 April 1978, proclaimed its
respect for fundamental human rights and postulated that
their observance in the work of its institutions through the
Community was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
European Commission on Human Rights (see D v Belgium
and the European Communities, re the European School in Brussels
[1987] 2 CMLR 57). This did not resolve the issue of
access to the ECtHR for acts by the EU institutions
thought to be in violation of ECHR.
Stage 3: The case made for accession
It was also in the 1970s that the idea began to emerge
that the European Community might as well accede to
ECHR. In 1978, key commentators such as Professor
Schermers spoke in favour of accession. But the idea was
slow to find political backing. The Single European Act
brought no major changes at Treaty level, although the
European Courts of Justice continued to apply the “general
principle” doctrine. In 1992, a political union was created
by the Treaty of Maastricht. In Article F2 the ECHR was
recognised as part of the Treaties, but still not granted
legally binding status.
In 1996 the ECJ ruled that:
“No Treaty provision confers on the Community institutions
any general power to enact rules on human rights or to
conclude international conventions in this field. Accession
to the Convention would, however, entail a substantial
change in the present Community system of the protection of
human rights in that it would entail the entry of the
Community into a distinct international institutional system
as well as integration of all the provisions of the Convention
into the Community legal order. Such a modification of the
system for the protection of human rights in the
Community, with equally fundamental institutional
Implications for the Community and for the member States,
would be of constitutional significance and would therefore
be such as to go beyond the scope of Article 235. It could
be brought only by way of Treaty amendment” (Opinion
2/94 of the European Court of Justice of 28 March 1996
concerning the accession by the Community to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms).
The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 included a specific
commitment to the protection of fundamental rights in
Article 13, extending protection from discrimination
beyond gender discrimination in Article 141 and on
nationality (Art 7). This Treaty clarified that the
jurisdiction of the ECJ under the Treaty of the European
Community (TEC) applied to Article 6(2) TEU with
regard to action of the EU institutions (Art 46(d) TEU).
Amsterdam also gave the EU the power to impose
penalties for the persistent breach of fundamental rights by
a Member State.
Subsequently, during debates on the Treaty of Nice IGC,
Finland proposed the following amendment to (then)
Article 303EC:
“the Community shall establish all appropriate forms of
cooperation with the Council of Europe. The Community shall
have the competence to accede to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
signed in Rome on 4 November, 1950” (see the European
Convention (2002) Working Group II, Incorporation of the
Charter/accession to the EHCR, Working Document 15, 12
September). 9
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This was rejected. Article 6 of the Treaty of Nice did
however confirm that the Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States. Breaches of
these principles can entail sanctions (Art 7) and prevent
admission to the EU (Art 49 EU Treaty).
It was not until 2002, during the work leading to the
proposed EU constitution, that the case for accession was
forcefully made. Working Group II of the Convention on
the Incorporation of the Charter and accession to the
ECHR summarised the fundamental political and legal
arguments in favour of accession. A Convention working
document put it as follows.
1. Accession would strengthen the protection of
European citizens who are presently denied the right to
bring applications against the institutions of the EU and
in greater Europe.
2. It is essential to avoid a situation in which there are
alternative, competing and conflicting systems of
human rights protection within the European Union
and in greater Europe.
3. Dual protection systems would weaken the overall pro-
tection offered and undermine legal certainty in the
human rights field of Europe. Divergent catalogues
would be applied by the ECtHR and the Court of
Justice, each acting within its own context. The risk of
divergent praxis is not just theoretical. It has already
occurred and will continue to pose problems.
Reference can be made to the question whether a per-
son’s right to respect his or her home (Art 8 ECHR)
covers also business premises, the precise scope of the
right to remain silent and not to contribute to incrim-
inating oneself (Art 6 ECHR) or to the judgments given
with respect to the prohibition to disseminate in
Ireland information regarding abortions lawfully car-
ried out in the UK (Art 10 ECHR). Such differences
of approach can be explained by the simple fact that
one court has primarily the responsibility to ensure the
efficient operation of the internal market, while the
other is charged with protecting fundamental rights.
4. Acts by some EU bodies remain outside the control of
the ECtHR and yet the Strasbourg court will continue
to hold Member States responsible (see for instance
Cantoni v France (1996) or TI v UK (Appl 43844, 7
March 2000); Senator Lines case Appl 56672/00).
5. The credibility of the Community in the eyes of third
countries would be considerably enhanced if the EU
was prepared to arrange for an independent body to
subject respect for human rights to a critical review.
6. Accession would have the advantage of enabling the
Community institutions to play a full role in proceed-
ings before the ECtHR that concern Community law.
7. Accession would prevent the creation of new dividing
lines on the European continent. The human rights
acquis of the CoE and the common standards defended
by the MS of the CoE and of the EU are the same. An
accession is not a contradiction with the right of the
EU and its Member States to offer higher levels of
human rights protection in certain areas. On the other
hand, a dual system of rights poses a risk not only to the
fundamental principle of universality of human rights
but also the inherent danger of the re-emergence of a
“Europe à deux vitesses” in an area – common human
rights standards – where such divisions must not exist
(European Convention (2002) Working Group II,
Working Document 15, Incorporation of the
Charter/Accession to the ECHR, document by Ingvar
Sveznsson and Mrs Lena Hjelm-Wallén).
Thus, accession was seen as being the most effective way
to ensue the necessary coherence between the ECHR and
Community law – provided that it is regulated in a manner
consistent with exiting Community competence. The final
report of the Convention in 2002 claimed that accession
would give a strong political signal of coherence between
the European Union and the “greater Europe”; would give
citizens an analogous protection vis-à-vis acts of the Union
as they presently enjoy vis-à-vis the Member States; and
would ensure harmonious development of the case law of
the two courts, especially in view of the incorporation of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Treaties
(Final Report of Working Group II, CONV 354/02, 22
October 2002, pp 11-12).
PART 2: PREPARING FOR ACCESSION
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,
a specific legal basis exists for the Union’s accession of the
ECHR. Article 6(2) TEU stipulates that the Union shall
accede to the ECHR, and that such accession shall not
affect the Union’s competence. Article 6(3) TEU reaffirms
that fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR, and
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member states constitute general principles of the
Union’s law. The European Community/Union is already a
party to a number of Council of Europe conventions.
The ECHR was originally drafted with state parties only
in mind. However Protocol 14 to the ECHR, which
entered into force on 1 June 2010, contains a provision
which would allow the EU to accede to the Convention
(amending Art 59 of the ECHR). The Interlaken
Declaration (High Level Conference on the future of the
European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration,
19 February 2010) welcomed the entry into force of this
Protocol but also called for measures to increase the
efficiency of the ECtHR. Ways must be found to reduce
the number of clearly inadmissible applications (see the
principle of equivalence below, which leads to rulings of
inadmissibility); and to ensure the full and rapid execution
of the final judgments of the court and to supervise the10
Amicus Curiae Issue 86 Summer 2011
18388 Amicus 86 summer text.qxd:Text  23/8/11  15:25  Page 10
execution of the court’s judgments. At present, after
exhaustion of national and EU remedies, cases can take
over 10 years to reach the ECtHR (see for example Case
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Aninim Sirketi v Ireland,
Appl no 45036/98 Decision as to admissibility of 30 June
2005, (GC) 42 EHRR 1). The Declaration also stresses the
need to simplify the procedure for amending Convention
provisions of an organisational nature.
One may ask why accession took so long, only to become
possible today. Accession to ECHR has been discussed for
about 40 years and, from substantive and practical points
of view, it could be said that the urgency to accede has
diminished in the meanwhile, due to case law of the ECJ
and legislative developments within the EU such as the
adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
attached to the Lisbon Treaty.
In a report on the institutional aspects of accession, the
European Parliament stressed the main arguments in
favour of accession of the European Union to ECHR.
“Accession constitutes a move forward in the process of
European integration and involves one further step towards
political Union.
While the Union’s system for the protection of fundamental
rights will be supplemented and enhanced by the
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into its
primary law, its accession to the ECHR will send a strong
signal concerning the coherence between the Union and the
countries belonging to the Council of Europe and its pan-
European human rights system.
Accession will also enhance the credibility of the Union in the
eyes of third countries which it regularly calls upon in its
bilateral reports to respect the ECHR.
Accession to the ECHR will afford citizens protection against
the action of the Union similar to that which they already
enjoy against action by all the Member States.
This is all the more relevant because the Member States have
transferred substantial powers to the Union, Legislative and
case law harmonisation in the field of human rights of the
rule of law of the EU and the ECHR will contribute to the
harmonious development of the two European courts in the
field of human rights, particularly because of the increased
need for dialogue and cooperation, and thus will create an
integral system, in which the two courts will function in
synchrony.
Accession will also compensate to some extent for the fact that
the scope of the Court of Justice of the European Union is
somewhat constrained in the matters of foreign and security
policy and police and security policy by providing useful
external judicial supervision of all EU activities.
Accession will not in any way call into question the principle
of the autonomy of the Union’s law, as the Court of Justice of
the European Union will remain the sole supreme court
adjudicating on issues relating to EU law and the validity of
the Union’s acts, as the European Court of Human Rights
must be regarded not only as a superior authority but rather
as a specialised court exercising external supervision over the
Union’s compliance with obligations under international law
arising from its accession to the ECHR.
The relationship between the two European courts shall not
be hierarchical but rather a relationship of specialisation –
thus the Court of Justice of the European Union will have a
status analogous to that currently enjoyed by the supreme
courts of the Member States in relation to the European Court
of Human Rights (European Parliament (2010), Report on
the institutional aspects of the accession of the European
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(2009/2241(INI)), Committee on Constitutional Affairs,
Rapporteur: Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Rapporteur for the
opinion of the Committee on civil liberties, justice and home
affairs: Kinga Gál).”
The Stockholm Programme requested that a “rapid”
accession to the ECHR should be made (point 2.1) and
invited the Commission to submit a proposal on the
accession of the EU to the European Convention on
Human Rights as a matter of urgency. This was seen as part
of a plan to strengthen the European judicial area and to
legitimise European criminal law.
At the time of writing, a draft agreement is under
discussion. This agreement covers the object and scope of
the agreement. It is anticipated that the EU will be entitled
to make reservations to the Convention and to its
Protocols in accordance with Article 57 of the Convention.
Of particular interest is the introduction of a co-
respondent mechanism. It is not clear at this stage of the
negotiations how this system will work in practice. The EU
may be joined to proceedings as a co-respondent whenever
a Member State is defending a breach of fundamental
rights as a result of implementing EU law. A second
scenario is one where there is a substantive link between an
alleged violation and legal acts or measures of the European
Union, then the ECtHR could decide to join parties to the
proceedings, after a hearing. In either case, both the
Member State and the EU could be found jointly
responsible for a violation of ECHR
The European Union and its Member States will have
to adopt internal rules setting out the respective
obligations in relation to the operation of the co-
respondent mechanism. The Court of Justice of the
European Union will have the opportunity to rule on the
validity or conformity of the act of the EU with regard to
fundamental rights, prior to a decision by the ECtHR.
The Court of Justice will ensure that the ruling is
delivered quickly, so that the proceedings before the
ECtHR are not unduly delayed. The procedure of the
ECtHR will take into account the proceedings before the
Court of Justice. 11
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It is anticipated that a judge from the Court of Justice of
the European Union will be elected to serve in the ECtHR,
although the modalities for election are still being discussed.
The European Union shall likewise be invited to take part in
the meetings of the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe. The European Union will also contribute to the
expenditure related to the functioning of the Convention.
This expenditure relates to the functioning of the ECtHR,
the supervision of the judgments of the court, the
functioning of the Committee of the Ministers, and the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe when
performing their functions under the Convention. (For up
to date information on negotiations, please see
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/cddh-
ue/CDDH-UE_meetings_en.asp (also http://www.coe.int
/ t /dgh l / s t anda rd se t t ing /h rpo l i c y / cddh-ue / cddh-
ue_documents_EN.asp).
The agreement on accession is subject to unanimous
agreement by the European Council in accordance with
Article 218(8) TFEU. It also has to be approved by all 47
existing parties to the ECHR. The Council also has to
obtain the consent of the European Parliament for
concluding the agreement. Article 218(10) TFEU provides
for the European Parliament to be fully informed of all
stages of negotiations (see White, S (2010), “The EU’s
accession to the Convention on Human Rights : a new era
of closer cooperation between the Council of Europe and
the EU?” NJECL Vol 1, Issue 4, pp 433-46).
Negotiations have proceeded at a fair pace since 2010.
Issues that seemed insurmountable at the onset – like the
interplay of the Court of Justice of the European Union
and of the European Court of Human Rights, the
appointment of an EU judge to the ECtHR, the co-
respondent mechanism – seem to be well on the way to
resolution. It is clear that we now have tremendous
political impetus to achieve accession, although of course
there are a number of hurdles that need to be overcome.
Accession will pave the way for closer cooperation
between the Council of Europe and the EU, and perhaps
even in the long term for accession of the EU to the
Council of Europe, as advocated in the 2006 Juncker Report
(Council of Europe (2006), Council of Europe-European
Union, A sole ambition for the European continent, report by
Jean-Claude Juncker, Primer Minister of the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg, to the attention of the Heads of State of
Government of the Member States of the Council of
Europe, 11 April 2006). This could include coordinating
legislative initiatives, establishing a joint platform for
assessment of standards, seeking the complementarity of
texts and, when appropriate, adopting each other’s
standards. Cooperative activities should be intensified
through the Venice Commission, the European
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ),
GRECO, and Moneyval. Accession to these instruments
should be encouraged in due course.
The report recommends the forging of closer inter-
Parliamentary ties, taking the form of meetings between the
conferences of the Presidents of the political groups in the
EP and the Political Assembly of the Council of Europe, and
regular and ad hoc meetings between the committee chairs
of both assemblies (recommendation 11). It also advocates
closer cooperation under the European Neighbourhood
Policy (recommendation 7). This is a great opportunity for
the two supra-national agencies to work more closely
together and to draw on each other’s strengths.
Simone White
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